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Litigating Second Life Land Disputes: A
Consumer Protection Approach
Paul Riley∗
A Secondary world may be full of extraordinary
beings . . . and extraordinary events . . . but, like the
primary world, it must, if it is to carry conviction,
seem to be a world governed by laws, not by pure
chance.1
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INTRODUCTION
Anshe Chung is your typical real estate entrepreneur.2 Her
business, Anshe Chung Studios, employs over eighty designers,
architects, and other staff; and the property she has developed
houses and provides commercial space for thousands of people on
over forty square kilometers of land.3 With so much development
for so many lessees, renters, and purchasers, it is not terribly
surprising that Chung’s business has made her a millionaire.4
What may come as a surprise, however, is that neither Chung nor
the land she develops actually exists––at least not in the physical,
corporeal sense.5 Though the dollars Chung receives for her
parcels of land are real, she is simply an avatar,6 an online
2

See Robert D. Hof, My Virtual Life, BUS. WK., May 1, 2006, at 72.
See Anshe Chung Studios—Introduction, http://acs.anshechung.com (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009).
4
See Hof, supra note 2, at 72; Press Release, Anshe Chung Studios, Anshe Chung
Becomes First Virtual World Millionaire (Nov. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.anshechung.com/include/press/press_release251106.html [hereinafter Press
Release, Anshe Chung Studios].
5
Hof, supra note 2, at 72.
6
“Representational proxies in . . . virtual spaces are known as ‘avatars,’ a word of
Hindu religious origin.” F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual
Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (citing Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies 6
(CESifo,
Working
Paper
No.
752,
2002),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=338500).
3
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representation of the Chinese businesswoman Ailin Graef, and
Chung and the land she develops for her customers only exist in
the virtual world7 Second Life. The “land” is in reality nothing
more than space on servers located in California, where Linden
Research, Inc. (“Linden”), the operator of Second Life, maintains
its headquarters.8
As against other users of Second Life, Chung seemingly has all
of the property rights in the proverbial bundle.9 She can use the
land that she buys from Linden10 for herself. She can transfer it to
others.11 Indeed, Chung’s entire business model relies on free
alienability of her virtual land.12 Perhaps most importantly,13 she

7

Edward Castronova, an economist, defines “virtual world” as follows:
A virtual world . . . is a computer program with three defining
features: [(1)] Interactivity: it exists in one computer but can be
accessed remotely (i.e. by an internet connection) and simultaneously
by a large number of people, with the command inputs of one person
affecting the command results of other people[; (2) p]hysicality:
people access the program though an interface that simulates a firstperson physical environment on their computer screen[; and (3)
p]ersistence: the program continues to run whether anyone is using it
or not; it remembers the location of people and things, as well as
ownership of objects.
Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the
Cyberian Frontier 6–7 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 618, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828.
8
See Press Release, Anshe Chung Studios, supra note 4 (“The fortune Chung
commands in Second Life . . . is supported by 550 servers or land ‘simulators.’”).
9
The description of property as a bundle of rights is a familiar trope in many law
school property classes, and it has been used many times by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002) (“A common idiom describes property
as a ‘bundle of sticks’––a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations,
constitute property.”).
10
Linden provides land to its users via an auction system. See Second Life—Land
Auctions, http://usd.auctions.secondlife.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
11
See Second Life—Purchasing Land, http://secondlife.com/land/purchasing.php (last
visited Feb. 23, 2009) (“Residents are always putting plots of land up for sale. You can
see what’s currently on the market by checking out Second Life’s inworld map to view
what’s currently for sale . . . .”).
12
See Press Release, Anshe Chung Studios, supra note 4.
13
See generally Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1982) (“[T]he landowner’s right to exclude [is] ‘one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))).
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can also exclude other users from coming upon it.14 However, as
against Linden, Chung has none of these rights, because in order to
use Second Life, she, like all users, agreed to Second Life’s Terms
of Service (“ToS”) that classify her not as an owner of land at all,
but instead as merely a licensee of Linden’s server space.15 Thus,
according to the ToS, Linden can shut down Chung’s Second Life
account and seize all of her virtual assets for any or no reason.16
Moreover, it can do so without paying her compensation.17
Indeed, Linden’s ToS emphasize that Linden has no duty to protect
any value purchased or created by Second Life users.18 Linden, of
course, has every incentive to keep Chung happily in business in
Second Life. After all, she helps drive its economy by providing
other users with developed land, a valuable service that is
attractive to current and potential users of Second Life. But what
if Chung violated a term of the ToS, and Linden, as a result,
terminated Chung’s account? What rights, if any, would Chung
have to her virtual assets? Moreover, if a court found that Chung
had some sort of property rights to her assets, would these rights be
trumped by Linden’s contract rights under the ToS? These rather
14

See Posting of Glyn Moody to Open . . . , Interview with Second Life’s Philip
Rosedale, Part II, http://opendotdotdot.blogspot.com/2006/11/interview-with-secondlifes-philip_28.html (Nov. 28, 2006, 1:28 P.M.) (stating that landowners in Second Life
have an ability to exclude others from their land if they choose to do so as landowners).
15
See Second Life—Terms of Service § 3.1, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Second Life—Terms of Service] (“Subject to the
terms of this Agreement, Linden Lab grants to you a non-exclusive, limited, fully
revocable license to use the Linden Software and the rest of the Service during the time
you are in full compliance with the Terms of Service.”).
16
The ToS provide:
Linden Lab reserves the right to interrupt the Service with or without
prior notice for any reason or no reason. You agree that Linden Lab
will not be liable for any interruption of the Service, delay or failure
to perform, and you understand that except as otherwise specifically
provided in Linden Lab’s billing policies posted at
http://secondlife.com/corporate/billing.php, you shall not be entitled
to any refunds of fees for interruption of service or failure to perform.
Linden Lab has the right at any time for any reason or no reason to
change and/or eliminate any aspect(s) of the Service as it sees fit in
its sole discretion.
Id. § 1.6.
17
See id §§ 1.6, 5.3.
18
Id. § 5.3 (“Linden Lab does not provide or guarantee, and expressly disclaims . . .
any value, cash or otherwise, attributed to any data residing on Linden Lab’s servers.”).

VOL19_BOOK3_RILEY

2009]

4/21/2009 9:39:07 PM

SECOND LIFE LAND DISPUTES

881

basic questions demonstrate Second Life’s new framing of the old
struggle between property law and contract law.19
Many commentators have made the normative case for why the
law should recognize virtual property such as Chung’s land or the
buildings that sit upon it,20 and some have suggested, as a practical
matter, how a court might overcome the problem of the
intangibility of virtual assets.21 Still other commentators have
argued that virtual-world End User Licensing Agreements
(“EULAs”) and ToS, including the ToS used by Linden for Second
Life, should be struck down as unconscionable.22 While this Note
shares the sentiment that courts should recognize virtual property
rights, it argues that, at least in the near term, they will not—given
19

See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1083–
84 (2005) (“[W]hy should we permit consensual agreements that prevent formation of
property rights in the first instance any more than we tolerate other consensual restraints
on alienation? The function of property law is in large part to resist contractual
limitations on property use. If the restraint on alienation limits the property in question to
low-value uses, we term it an unreasonable restraint and do not enforce it.”); Molly
Shaffer van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008) (describing End
User Licensing Agreements, EULAs, as the “new servitudes” and tracing the history of
and judicial skepticism toward real covenants and equitable servitudes in the law).
20
See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1048 (“Should computer code that is designed
to act like real world property be regulated and protected like real world property? This
article contends that it should.”); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 72 (“[I]t seems
clear that virtual assets can be characterized as property for the purposes of real-world
law.”); Theodore J. Westbrook, Comment, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World
Property Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 781 (2008) (“[A]n understanding of
property theory suggests that property rights in virtual goods are bound to be recognized
or created gradually as society increasingly depends on such rights.”). Importantly,
treating virtual assets as property would not create a new form of property and, thus,
would not violate the common law’s ban on the creation of new types of property rights.
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (“In the common
law, the principle that property rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no
name. In the civil law, which recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus
clausus—the number is closed.”). The numerus clausus principle functions to limit the
creation of idiosyncratic property forms and consequently measurement, frustration, and
administrative costs. See Merrill & Smith, supra at 38.
21
See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1055–56; Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 42;
Allen Chein, Note, A Practical Look at Virtual Property, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1059,
1075 (2006).
22
See, e.g., Andrew Jankowich, The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making in
Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 52–53 (2006) (concluding that EULAs
and ToS should not be enforced because of their complete one-sidedness).
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the doctrinal deficiencies of the property- and contract-based
approaches to finding those rights and given the effects of recent
developments in the law regarding virtual worlds. Consequently,
this Note explores a third approach apart from property and
contract law. It examines Second Life, the virtual world that has
recently become the subject of heavy judicial23 and government
scrutiny,24 and argues that consumer protection law provides
Chung and other landowners in Second Life with the best means of
relief in the event that Linden seizes their virtual assets.
Consumer protection law not only allows a potential plaintiff to
avoid having to cut through the doctrinal Gordian knot presented
by the contract-based and property-based approaches to virtual
property issues, but also has a normative appeal because Second
Life, much more than any other virtual world, is so vigorously
commodified,25 and this commodification has largely been driven
by Linden’s representations to Second Life users. Two of the most
glaring examples of Second Life’s commodification are Linden’s
sales of land to Second Life users, which is the primary revenue
generator for Linden,26 and Linden’s active fostering of a currency
23
A virtual land deal gone awry was the subject of Bragg v. Linden Research, 487 F.
Supp. 2d 593, 604 (E.D. Pa. 2007). See infra Part I.C.1.
24
See, e.g., Wily Ferret, Second Life Shuts Down Casinos, INQUIRER, July 26, 2007,
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/flame_author/004/1029004/second-life-shuts-downcasinos/ (describing Linden’s decision to shut down casinos in Second Life after the FBI
launched an investigation into their legality); Adam Reuters, US Congress Launches
Probe into Virtual Economies, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS CENTER, Oct. 15, 2006,
http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2006/10/15/us-congress-launches-probe-into-virtualeconomies/ (describing Congress’s decision to investigate whether it should tax virtual
economies).
25
Jack Balkin explains the fundamental problem of commodification of virtual worlds
as follows:
If platform owners encourage real-world commodification of virtual
worlds, encourage people in these worlds to treat virtual items like
real property, and allow the sale and purchase of these assets as if
they were property, they should not be surprised if courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies begin to treat virtual items
as property.
Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES,
AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 86, 95 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds].
26
See Allen Rappeport, Second Life’s John Zdanowski, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2007,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9858165 (“Land sales and maintenance make up about
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exchange, the LindeX, where Second Life’s currency, the Linden
dollar, can be converted into U.S. dollars.27 The inevitable result
of this commodification, when taken together with Linden’s
representations about its virtual world, is reliance by Second Life
users that, among other things, their rights to the virtual land that
they believed they had purchased “free and clear,” a representation
that Linden’s former CEO, Philip Rosedale, has made,28 are the
same as their rights to real-world land to which they would
actually hold title.
Consumer protection law, unlike contract and property law, has
a normative appeal here because Second Life’s commodification
has transformed users of Second Life from mere “players” who are
there to enjoy the world’s camaraderie and community into
“consumers” who are there to spend and make money. Consumer
protection law recognizes the importance of this classification. It
jettisons the fiction that all actors in a marketplace have equal
bargaining power or sufficient information to bargain at all, and
instead affords relief to consumers based upon their classification
as such.29 Markets often are not efficient, market actors are not
60 percent of our billings.”). Interestingly, in an effort to grow its total land sales
revenue, Linden increased the land supply in Second Life and lowered its price. See, e.g.,
Eric Reuters, Linden to Increase Land Supply, Drop Prices, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS
CENTER, Apr. 8, 2008, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2008/04/08/linden-toincrease-land-supply-drop-prices/.
27
See Second Life—Currency Exchange, http://secondlife.com/whatis/currency.php
(last visited Feb. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Second Life—Currency Exchange] (“Several
online resources allow residents to convert Linden Dollars into US Dollars and viceversa. Rates fluctuate based on supply and demand, but over the last few years they have
remained fairly stable at approximately 250 Linden Dollars (L$) to the US Dollar.”).
28
Posting of Aleks Krotoski to Games Blog, Second Life and the Virtual Property
Boom,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/gamesblog/2005/jun/14/secondlifeand
(June 14, 2005, 10:41 BST) (“We launched Second Life without out of world trade and
after a few months we looked at it and thought, ‘We’re not doing this right, we’re doing
this wrong.’ We started selling land free and clear, and we sold the title, and we made it
extremely clear that we were not the owner of the virtual property.” (quoting Second
Life’s then-CEO and founder Philip Rosedale)).
29
See John Goldring, Consumer Law and Legal Theory: Reflections of a Common
Lawyer, 13 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 113, 116 (1990) [hereinafter Goldring, Consumer Law
and Legal Theory] (“A real distinction between those who need the protection of the law
and those who do not is based on their relative power. In general, consumers as
consumers lack power relative to suppliers and producers. It can be argued that one
function of consumer law is to redress this imbalance of power.”).
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always rational, and market actors often have relatively little
bargaining power.30 Consumer protection law, a legislative
product, recognizes these realities while the common law of
contract often does not.31 As discussed in detail below, one only
needs to look to the current judicial trend of strictly enforcing
EULAs and ToS for prominent examples of judicial failure to
recognize the nature of the marketplace and for an example of the
effect of this failure: the creation of doctrinal gaps in the common
law that can easily ensnare unwitting market participants.
Consumer protection law fills these doctrinal gaps and thus can
afford relief where the common law cannot.32 Some land
purchasers in Second Life, this Note concludes, have been
ensnared, and courts hearing disputes between Linden and
aggrieved Second Life users under California’s broad and powerful
consumer protection law will ignore neither the nature of Linden’s
representations nor the strong reliance interests that these
representations created. Consumer protection law’s doctrine is
readily available to Second Life users; this Note advocates that
they should use it.
Part I of this Note begins by providing context regarding
Second Life and explains the characteristics that make Second Life
so different from other virtual worlds. Next, Part I describes in
detail how the economy of Second Life functions and how Second
Life and particularly land sales there generate revenue for Linden.
Finally, Part I explores some of the property-based and contractbased arguments for judicial recognition of virtual property and
examines (1) Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., a case holding
Linden’s ToS unconscionable;33 (2) the changes Linden made to its
ToS in the wake of the court’s ruling; (3) how Bragg fits into the
existing case law regarding the enforceability of EULAs generally;
and (4) the likelihood of success of contract- and property-lawbased attacks on Linden in the future.
30

See id.
See John Goldring, Consumer Protection Globalization and Democracy, 6 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3–4 (1998) [hereinafter Goldring, Consumer Protection
Globalization and Democracy].
32
See id.
33
See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
31
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Part II discusses the consumer protection approach in detail. It
explains the elements of Second Life’s commodification and the
troublesome nature of Linden’s representations to its users.
Moreover, it explains how California’s consumer protection law
can regulate these representations and how specifically it can
provide relief to an aggrieved Second Life user.
I. SECOND LIFE’S LANDSCAPE, VIRTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONTRACT
A. Brave New World: Second Life’s Landscape
1. Why is Second Life Unique Among Virtual Worlds?
In his seminal cyberpunk thriller Snow Crash, Neal Stephenson
described an immersive online world in which millions of people
could enjoy second lives, existences not all that different from their
lives in the real world. He wrote:
Hiro is approaching the Street. It is the Broadway,
the Champs Élysées of the Metaverse. . . . It does
not really exist. But right now, millions of people
are walking up and down it. . . . Of these billion
potential computer owners, maybe a quarter of them
actually bother to own computers, and a quarter of
these have machines that are powerful . . . . That
makes for about sixty million people who can be on
at any given time.34
Stephenson referred to this world as the “Metaverse.”35 Simply
put, Second Life represents an attempt by Linden to make
Stephenson’s vision a reality.36 Second Life has millions of users

34

NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 24–26 (2008).
Id. at 24.
36
See Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Guilded Cage: User Created Content and Building
the Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 87–101 (2004) (stating that the Metaverse will
only be fully realized when the free markets are invited into the world and when users are
given ownership rights over their intellectual property and describing how Second Life
has taken both of these steps).
35
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from around the globe,37 and in July 2008 alone, economic activity
equaling “[o]ver US$9.5 million was traded on the LindeX.”38 In
Second Life, “residents,” as Linden refers to Second Life users,
can take part in many of the same activities as they can in the real
world. They take on pursuits as complex as running a business,39
staging a political rally for a real-world presidential candidate,40 or
engaging in acts of civil disobedience;41 and as simple as going to
a lecture42 or going for a spin with friends in the newest version of
Toyota’s Scion.43
These types of activities are quite different from the more
purely gaming activities carried out in traditional “leveling” virtual
worlds or massive multiplayer online role-playing games
(“MMORPGs”), as they are often called.44 In MMORPGs, such as
the hugely popular games World of Warcraft and EverQuest, a
37

See Second Life—FAQ, http://secondlife.com/whatis/faq.php (last visited Feb. 23,
2009) [hereinafter Second Life—FAQ]. There is, however, some dispute over just how
many of those users are logged in at any one time. See Shaun Rolph, The Phony
Economics of Second Life, REGISTER, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2007/02/20/second_life_analysis/print.html (stating that there are only 15,000 clients
logged in to Second Life at any one time).
38
Eric Reuters, Second Life’s User Economy Shows Strong Growth, REUTERS SECOND
LIFE NEWS CENTER, Aug. 27, 2008, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2008/08/27/
second-lifes-user-economy-shows-strong-growth/ (providing statistics on Second Life’s
economic activity).
39
See Adam Reuters, Surge in High-End Second Life Business Profits, REUTERS
SECOND LIFE NEWS CENTER, Dec. 5, 2006, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/
2006/12/05/surge-in-high-end-second-life-business-profits/ (describing the large growth
in the number of Second Life residents making more than $5000 a month).
40
See Posting of Sarah Wheaton to New York Times Caucus Blog, Obama is First in
Their Second Life, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/obama-is-first-intheir-second-life/ (Mar. 31, 2007, 3:52 P.M.) (describing grassroots organizers for Barack
Obama in Second Life).
41
See
generally
Second
Life:
Facts
for
the
Visitor,
WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.10/slfacts_pr.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009)
(describing the Second Life “Tax Revolt” in which users dressed in colonial garb covered
Second Life land with giant tea crates and signs protesting Linden’s tax on user created
content). This revolt proved successful, and Linden ultimately “repealed” the tax. Id.
42
For example, Judge Richard Posner gave a lecture in Second Life last year. See John
Bringardner, IP’s Brave New World, LAW.COM, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1170237755271; Alan Sipress, Where Real Money Meets Virtual Reality,
the Jury is Still Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006, at A1.
43
See Living a Second Life, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2006, at 79 (describing Toyota’s
decision to give away virtual drivable Scions to Second Life users).
44
See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 26–28.
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new user starts out the game as a weakling with neither the ability,
nor the weapons, to slay powerful foes.45 Because slaying enemies
is often what makes many of these games fun for a user, the user’s
objective, naturally, is to increase the power or “level” of her
avatar by taking on progressively more challenging tasks.46 For
example, in EverQuest, a user interested in increasing her level
must progress from killing snakes and rats at a very early stage to
slaying much more powerful beasts once her avatar is at an
appropriate level for the challenge.47 Second Life has no levels.
Indeed, it has no objective at all. Second Life is not a traditional
MMORPG and does not really regard itself as one.48
Creativity and ownership are the two greatest differences
between Second Life and traditional MMORPGs,49 and these
differences are at the very root of the commodification in the
virtual world. Second Life is a place for creativity because its
users are responsible for creating the content of the world and
everything in it.50 Indeed, Cory Ondrejka, a former executive at
Linden, has even gone as far as unequivocally stating that “[a]ll of
the content of Second Life is built by its users inside the world.”51
Users are able to create the content of the world because Linden
provides them with tools to manipulate small elements of virtual
matter, primitives, which are a sort of virtual-world equivalent to
real-world atoms.52 Using the process of atomistic construction,
therefore, Second Life users can create everything from an article
of virtual apparel to virtual office buildings. They can create

45

See id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
See Second Life—FAQ, supra note 37 (“Is Second Life a Game? Yes and no.
While the Second Life interface and display are similar to most [MMORPGs], there are
two key, unique differences: Creativity . . . Ownership.”).
49
See id.
50
See Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 77 (“By emphasizing creativity and
communication, Second Life is different from other synthetic worlds. Most . . .
MMORPGs . . . offer players pre-fabricated or themed fantasy worlds.”).
51
Symposium, Regulating Digital Environments: Ownership in Online Worlds, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 807, 820 (2006); see also Ondrejka, supra
note 36, at 87 (“Well over 99% of the objects in Second Life are user created . . . .”).
52
See Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 78.
46
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objects that look and act like real-world objects or objects that defy
the laws of physics.53
The second difference, ownership, is closely connected with
creativity. In order to further spur the creativity of its users and
accordingly the growth of in-world content, Linden recognizes
Second Life users’ intellectual property rights to the content they
create in Second Life.54 This idea is anathema in traditional
MMORPGs.55 In practice, this means that Second Life users have
control over the content they create and whether, among other
things, the content can be copied, modified or transferred to
others.56 Moreover, users are able to enforce these rights pursuant
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).57
Interestingly, however, users have very few rights to their creations
as against Linden.58 An exploration of the legal implications of
53

See id.
See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.2 (“Linden Lab
acknowledges and agrees that, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, you
will retain any and all applicable copyright and other intellectual property rights with
respect to any Content you create using the Service, to the extent you have such rights
under applicable law.”); Second Life—IP Rights, http://secondlife.com/whatis/
ip_rights.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (“Linden Lab’s Terms of Service agreement
recognizes Residents’ right to retain full intellectual property protection for the digital
content they create in Second Life, including avatar characters, clothing, scripts, textures,
objects and designs. This right is enforceable and applicable both in-world and offline,
both for non-profit and commercial ventures. You create it, you own it—and it’s yours to
do with as you please.”). Interestingly, one Second Life user recently trademarked her
avatar. See Benjamin Duranske, ‘Aimee Weber’ (TM) Gets USPTO Stamp of Approval for
Pigtails, Tutu, Wings, Tights, Stompy Boots, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/09/21/aimee-weber-trademark/.
55
See Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES,
AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 31, 37 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006)
(arguing from the perspective of a virtual-world designer that the designer of the virtual
world should have absolute control over her world in order to protect the integrity of the
game conceit).
56
Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 78.
57
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Second Life—DMCA: Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, http://secondlife.com/corporate/dmca.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
58
The ToS grant Linden Labs “a royalty-free, worldwide, fully paid-up, perpetual,
irrevocable, non-exclusive right and license to . . . use, reproduce and distribute [the]
Content within the Service . . . and . . . [the right to] use and reproduce (and to authorize
third parties to use and reproduce) any of [the] Content in any or all media for marketing
and/or promotional purposes . . . .” Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.2.
54
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this contractual provision is beyond the scope of this Note, though
it seems likely that this provision will be a source of litigation in
the future.59
Ownership and creativity in Second Life foster
commodification because they allow for the creation of not only
innovative products by users, but also a scarcity of those products
and, consequently, creation of a marketplace where users can sell
the in-world items that they create for Linden dollars, which they
can then exchange for real-world dollars.60 Since April 2007, the
trading activity of LindeX, Second Life’s currency exchange, has
averaged around $250,000 a day.61 Users have been attracted to
the commercial aspect of Second Life; running a business has
become one of the most popular activities that take place in the
virtual world.62 This is especially so given that in Second Life
there are very few of the barriers to entry that exist in the real
world and that the marginal cost of producing virtual inventory for
sale is literally nothing. Unsurprisingly, an entire cottage industry
has developed around helping Second Life residents open and run
in-world businesses.63
2. The Importance of Land in Second Life
Running a Second Life business, however, has its costs.
Importantly, only landowners in Second Life can sell their virtual
59

See generally Benjamin Duranske, Commentary: Second Life’s Terms of Service
Stifle Innovation by Making Patents Worthless In-World, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Sept. 27,
2007, http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/09/27/patent-rights-second-life.
60
See Second Life—Currency Exchange, supra note 27.
61
See Second Life Grid—Economics, http://secondlifegrid.net/spt/resources/factsheet/economics (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
62
See Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 78 (stating that as of 2006, there were
about 7,000 profitable businesses in Second Life); Second Life—Business Opportunities,
http://secondlife.com/whatis/businesses.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (“There are as
many opportunities for innovation and profit in Second Life as in the Real World. Open
a nightclub, sell jewelry, become a land speculator; the choice is yours to make.
Thousands of residents are making part or all of their real life income from their Second
Life Businesses.”).
63
One can see this simply by searching “second life business” on Amazon.com. There
are many books dedicated to the topic of running a business on Second Life. A cursory
search yields such titles as How to Make Real Money in Second Life and The
Entrepreneur’s Guide to Second Life.
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creations.64 In order to own land, a user must pay a monthly
membership fee, pay a land use fee, and purchase the land from
Linden or another Second Life user, such as Anshe Chung, who
has purchased the land from Linden.65 In this, Linden has
incentivized the user’s purchase of land in Second Life. This point
is particularly important because Linden’s primary source of
revenue is land sales.66 Again, this business model is markedly
different from that of traditional MMORPGs, where the providers
earn a bulk of their revenue from subscriptions.67 Linden also
charges a monthly subscription for its “premium” accounts, and
these accounts make up a substantial portion of the balance of
Linden’s revenue;68 however, even this revenue is intertwined with
the acquisition and ownership of land. The primary benefit of a
premium account, after all, is that it provides a “land ownership
opportunity.”69 While a user with a basic (free) account can join
Second Life, customize an avatar, interact with others, and even
use Second Life’s atomistic construction tools, she cannot own
land, and thus run a business, without upgrading to a premium
membership.70 Land ownership, therefore, is not only very
important to Second Life users, but also to Linden. For users, land
ownership provides the opportunity to run a business and in some
cases, as with Ms. Chung, serves as the basis of the business. For
Linden, land and services connected with land generate a
substantial majority of its revenue.
64

See Second Life—Frequently Asked Questions from Beginning Landowners,
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task=knowledge&q
uestionID=5198 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Second Life—FAQ from
Beginning Landowners] (“Residents use their land to build homes and businesses.”).
65
Id.
66
Rappeport, supra note 26; Linden Lab—Factsheet: Economics, http://lindenlab.com/
pressroom/general/factsheets/economics/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Linden
Lab, Factsheet: Economics] (“Linden Lab’s primary revenue stream comes from the lease
of virtual land.”).
67
See EDWARD CASTRONOVA, EXODUS TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD 32–33 (2007) (“In the
late 1990s, all games were based on a monthly subscription model. . . . But new revenue
models have been introduced . . . . Second Life, for example, offers free registration to
anyone who wants it.”).
68
See Linden Lab—Factsheet: Economics, supra note 66.
69
See Second Life—Membership Plans, http://secondlife.com/whatis/plans.php (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009).
70
See id.
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Because land sales are Linden’s lifeblood, it is unsurprising
that Linden actively markets its land to users with many different
representations.
Part II.C of this Note explores those
representations, their limits, and their consequences in its
discussion of the benefits of consumer protection law for aggrieved
Second Life users. First, however, the next Section briefly
examines some of the property-based arguments for judicial
recognition of virtual property.
B. Virtual Property Scholarship
Though the leading scholars on virtual property issues explain
why and to what extent a court should protect virtual property
under property law, these commentators fail to address, as a
practical matter, how, given the current state of both property and
contract law, a court would go about finding a virtual property
right. This how question is particularly important given that all
virtual worlds are governed by ToS and EULAs that have the
function of inextricably intertwining property and contract law
issues.71 Put simply, in order to find a user’s property rights in
land or other virtual assets in Second Life, a court must take two
steps. First, it must strike down or otherwise refuse to enforce
Linden’s ToS. Second, it must articulate the property law basis of
its decision. This Section provides a brief overview of some of the
property-based justifications for judicial recognition of virtual
property.

71

Lastowka and Hunter do acknowledge the general problems posed by EULAs and
ToS. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 72. But they do not adequately explain
that before a court is able to find a property right in virtual assets, it must first strike
down the contract between the user and the world operator. Fairfield also recognizes that
perhaps because of EULAs and ToS, courts have yet to recognize virtual property rights.
See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1050. But he sees ToS and EULAs as unreasonable, and
thus unenforceable, restraints on property use. See id. at 1083. However, he, like
Lastowka and Hunter, does not discuss the current case law and the general reluctance of
courts to strike down EULAs and ToS.
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1. Normative Justifications for Recognition of Virtual
Property
Professors Dan Hunter and Gregory Lastowka were among the
first commentators to explore the strong normative justifications
for legal recognition of user rights in virtual property:72 Locke’s
labor-desert theory, Hegel’s personhood theory, and Bentham’s
utilitarian theory, they argue, “all provide strong normative
grounds for recognizing that property rights should inhere in
virtual assets, whether chattels, realty, or avatars.”73 Additionally,
neither metaphysical nor temporal problems, Hunter and Lastowka
argue, are problematic to recognition of virtual property.74
Regarding metaphysical problems, our property system has long
been characterized by a shift from the tangible to the intangible.75
The demise of the livery of seisin is perhaps the oldest example of
this shift. Regarding temporal problems, many forms of property
have temporal restrictions.76 Thus, just as a user of Second Life
may not participate in land ownership activities if she does not pay
her monthly fee, a lessee may only occupy her apartment for the
period of her lease, or a copyright owner may only retain that right
during the life of the work’s author plus seventy years.77
Similarly, Professor Joshua Fairfield also provides a normative
justification for judicial recognition of virtual property.78 He
argues that three behaviors of property in virtual worlds make it
more like physical property than something like computer code:
rivalrousness, persistence, and interconnectivity.79 He describes
these three traits as follows:
If I hold a pen, I have it and you don’t. [That is]
[r]ivalrousness. If I put the pen down and leave the
72

See generally Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 43–49.
Id. at 48–49. But see Stephen J. Horowitz, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual
Property, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 443, 457 (2007) (arguing that, from a Lockean
perspective, an operator of a virtual world like Linden has a stronger labor-based claim
than users).
74
See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 40–43.
75
See id. at 40.
76
Id. at 42.
77
See id.
78
See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1054–55.
79
Id.
73
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room, it’s still there. That is persistence. And
finally, you can all interact with the pen—with my
permission, you can experience it.
That is
interconnectivity. Why is code trying so hard to
mimic these properties? Rivalrousness gives me the
ability to invest in my property without fear that
other people may take what I have built.
Persistence protects my investment by ensuring that
it lasts. Interconnectivity increases the value of my
property due to network effects—not least of which
is the fact that other people’s experience of my
resource may be such that it becomes desirable, and
hence marketable, to them.80
Take land in Second Life as an example. It is rivalrous
because once a user purchases it, she can exclude others from
entering upon it. It is persistent because when a user signs off her
Second Life account, the land and the developments she has made
to it remain in the virtual world.
Finally, it exhibits
interconnectivity because the user can allow others to interact with
the land by allowing them to come upon it or lease a portion of it.
Fairfield proposes property rights recognition at the level of
code for virtual property81 because at the level of code “the power
of an owner persists over the use of the virtual property regardless
of the system or chattel currently connected to it.”82 In Second
Life, for example, the owner of a piece of virtual land consisting of
code on a server would own that code regardless of the intellectual
property rights inherent in the underlying code and regardless of
80

Id.
Id. at 1077–78 (“Since virtual property operates as a unified whole only at the level
of code, the appropriate package of property also appears at the level of code. That is the
right that matters. . . . The code right is what is important, no matter what system or
chattel the code runs on. So, when considering where to make the slice between online
property rights, we will preserve useful bundles of rights by granting rights to virtual
property at the level of code.”).
82
Id. at 1078. Fairfield’s argument that the code level is the appropriate level in which
to determine property rights to some extent challenges Professor Richard Epstein’s
“chattel theory” that property affects cyberspace through actual chattel property rights in
physical computers or servers. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
73, 75 (2003).
81

VOL19_BOOK3_RILEY

894

4/21/2009 9:39:07 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:877

Linden’s ownership of the servers themselves.83 Moreover, this
level of recognition, Fairfield contends, will best prevent an
anticommons84 in virtual property:85
[A]lthough the idea of the anticommons is recent,
the function of property law in preventing an
anticommons is not. The common law of property
has long sought to unify marketable title in a single
person who has the full incentives to maximize the
value, minimize the damage, and alienate the
property when someone can put it to better use.86
Prevention of the anticommons, Fairfield concludes, can best
be achieved by regulating virtual property according to a system
like the common law of property.87
2. A Practical Approach
Another commentator, Allen Chein, departs from the
normative justifications of Lastowka and Hunter, and the
anticommons argument of Fairfield, and instead explores how, as a
practical matter, a court might find a property right in virtual
assets. He looks to domain name litigation for this answer.88 In

83

See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1078.
See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623 (1998) (“Anticommons property [is] a
type of property regime that may result when initial endowments are created as
disaggregated rights rather than as coherent bundles of rights in scarce resources.”).
Heller’s quintessential example of the anticommons problem at work was the practice of
Moscow vendors: the vendors hawked their goods at stands in front of empty storefronts
on Russian streets and not in the stores themselves because the stores had impossibly
tangled webs of ownership rights and entitlements. See id. at 639–42. The vendors were
unable to determine who had the rights and entitlements to the storefronts; consequently,
the storefronts went unused even though there was market demand for the space they
provided. Id. Professors Heller and Eisenberg also wrote about the anticommons
problems raised by biotechnology patent claims. See generally Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). They argue that patent claims result in upstream
tangles that can possibly hinder downstream technological development. Id.
85
See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1076.
86
Id. at 1071.
87
Id. at 1089.
88
See Chein, supra note 21, at 1073–75.
84
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particular, he examines Kremen v. Cohen.89 There, the Ninth
Circuit applied a three-pronged test to determine whether a
property right existed in the intangible domain name, sex.com, in
an action for the name’s conversion.90 The Kremen court held that
a three-pronged test must be satisfied in order for it to find the
existence of a property right in an intangible object: “First, there
must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be
capable of exclusive possession; and third, the putative owner must
have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.”91 The domain
name, sex.com, satisfied this test.92
The court reasoned that a domain name was a well-defined
interest like a share of corporate stock—also intangible property—
or a plot of land because the registrant of the domain name is the
only person who decides where on the Internet those who invoke
the domain name in a web browser’s window are sent.93
Moreover, the court found that the domain name was capable of
exclusive possession and that Cohen had an established claim to
exclusivity because the domain name was originally registered
under his name.94 Registering a domain name, like recording a
title at the title office, the court maintained, serves a notice
function that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one
else’s.95
Underlying the court’s analysis was the recognition of two
other concerns about domain names. First, domain names, like
other property interests, could sometimes be worth a considerable
amount of money.96 Second, judicial recognition of a property
right in domain names ensures that registrants who have invested
labor in developing and promoting their websites reap the benefit
of their investments, thus promoting the growth of the Internet
overall.97
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1030; see Chein, supra note 21, at 1075.
Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Virtual assets, Chein declares, especially in a world such as
Second Life, could satisfy this test;98 however, he ultimately
concludes that a court would not recognize the interest because it
would strictly enforce the ToS or EULA of the virtual world.99
This issue of the general tendency of courts to enforce EULAs and
ToS is an important one, and it foreshadows the contract
discussion in the following Section of this Note.
C. The Contract Problem
Some virtual-world commentators assert that virtual-world
EULAs and ToS should be attacked by aggrieved litigants on the
grounds of unconscionability.100 Moreover, as discussed above,
the assumption of some of the commentators who advance
property-based arguments for virtual property is that the ToS and
EULAs are indeed unenforceable.101 Other commentators have
taken the opposite position.102
This Section briefly examines some of the relevant case law
regarding the enforceability of EULAs and ToS generally. First,
however, it examines the recent Bragg case, which struck down the
arbitration provision of Second Life’s ToS as unconscionable, and
the changes that Linden made to its ToS as a result of the case.
Given the state of the law concerning EULAs and ToS and the
changes Linden made to its ToS in the wake of the Bragg case, this
Section maintains that contract-based attacks on Linden will not be
successful in the future. And, of course, if an aggrieved litigant
cannot successfully attack Linden’s ToS, he or she cannot
98

See Chein, supra note 21, at 1090.
Id.
100
See, e.g., Jankowich, supra note 22, at 53.
101
See supra note 71.
102
See, e.g., Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the
Dawn of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 303 (2007) (stating that, at least in the near
term, it is unlikely that a court will void EULAs as unconscionable); David P. Sheldon,
Claiming Ownership, but Getting Owned: Contractual Limitations on Asserting Property
Interests in Virtual Goods, 54 UCLA L. REV. 751, 777 (2007) (“Existing case law tends
to weigh against parties attacking EULA on grounds of unconscionability.”); Chein,
supra note 21, at 1090 (concluding that virtual-world EULAs will be enforced); Bobby
Glushko, Note, Tales of the Virtual City: Governing Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507, 516 (2007) (presuming the general trend of enforceability
of EULAs).
99
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successfully establish a property-based justification for judicial
recognition of virtual property.
1. The Bragg Case
Marc Woebegone, the avatar of Pennsylvania attorney Marc
Bragg, owned land in Second Life, some of which he purchased
for the purpose of speculation.103 In April 2006, Bragg discovered
a glitch in Second Life’s land auction system that allowed him to
buy a plot of land called “Taessot” for $300 when such a plot
usually costs $1000.104 When Linden learned of this exploit, it
shut down Bragg’s account, deleted his avatar, and confiscated not
only Taessot, but also all of the land that Bragg had purchased and
developed before the dubious transaction concerning Taessot.105
Bragg filed suit in Pennsylvania state court alleging a number
of causes of action including fraud, conversion, breach of contract,
and violations of consumer protection laws.106 The common
element among all of these causes of actions was a theory of
reasonable reliance: Bragg argued that he relied upon Linden’s and
its CEO’s representations purporting to convey rights to virtual
property in Second Life equivalent to real-world property rights
and was thus induced to purchase land in Second Life.107 The
complaint contained many troublesome representations by
Linden.108 For example, it cited a Guardian Unlimited interview
with Linden’s then-CEO, Philip Rosedale.109 In response to a
question concerning Western capitalism, Rosedale said:
We like to think of Second Life as ostensibly as real
as a developing nation. . . . The fundamental basis
of a successful developing nation is property
103
See Kathleen Craig, Second Life Land Deal Goes Sour, WIRED, May 18, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/news/2006/05/70909.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Complaint at 31–46, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (No. 06-04925) [hereinafter Bragg Complaint], available at http://lawyers.com/BraggvLinden_Complaint.pdf (original complaint filed Oct. 4, 2006, in Chester
County Court of Common Pleas, then removed to federal court on Nov. 7, 2006).
107
Id.
108
See id. at 6–22.
109
Id. at 9–10.
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ownership. . . . We started selling land free and
clear, and we sold the title, and we made it
extremely clear that we were not the owner of the
virtual property.110
Additionally, Bragg’s complaint seemed to suggest that
Linden’s recognition of its users’ intellectual property rights in
their creations caused the Second Life users to conflate their rights
to virtual property such as land with their own intellectual
property.111
Regarding the ToS, which gives Linden the unilateral right to
shut down a user’s account and seize her land,112 Bragg maintained
that the ToS were an unconscionable contract void as against
public policy,113 and in the alternative, that Linden’s
representations materially altered the ToS.114
In response, Linden removed the case to federal court and
shortly thereafter moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a
mandatory arbitration clause in the ToS and to dismiss Bragg’s
lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction over Philip Rosedale,
Linden’s CEO at the time, who was also named as a defendant in
the suit.115 The court rejected both motions.116 It first held that
Rosedale’s representations provided sufficient minimum contacts
with Pennsylvania for the court to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over him.117 The court reasoned that it had specific
personal jurisdiction over Rosedale for two reasons. First,
Rosedale “helped orchestrate a campaign at the national level to
110

Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Krotoski, supra note 28).
See id. at 11 (“In discussing the importance of land ownership . . . Rosedale stated:
‘[S]uccessful countries always start by making sure that people can freely own, resell,
and mortgage the real-estate on which they live. This is a Very Big Idea . . . [.] This was
one of the key things that drove our ideas around land ownership and the introduction of
IP rights.’”).
112
See generally Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15.
113
Bragg Complaint, supra note 106, at 25.
114
Id. at 29.
115
See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
116
Id. at 603, 611.
117
See id. at 598 (“The Court holds that Rosedale’s representations—which were made
as part of a national campaign to induce persons, including Bragg, to visit Second Life
and purchase virtual property—constitute sufficient contacts to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over Rosedale.”).
111
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induce persons, including Bragg, to purchase virtual land and
property on Second Life.”118 Second, Rosedale’s marketing efforts
were more active than passive.119 Indeed, the court concluded:
[Rosedale] was the hawker sitting outside Second
Life’s circus tent, singing the marvels of what was
contained inside to entice customers to enter. . . .
Significantly, participants could even interact with
Rosedale’s avatar on Second Life during town hall
meetings that he held on the topic of virtual
property.120
The court then held that the arbitration clause in the ToS was
both substantively and procedurally unconscionable and, thus,
refused to enforce it.121 The court stated:
Taken together, the lack of mutuality, the cost of
arbitration, the forum-selection clause, and the
confidentiality provision that Linden unilaterally
imposes through the TOS demonstrate that the
arbitration clause is not designed to provide Second
Life participants an effective means of resolving
disputes with Linden. Rather, it is a one-sided
means which tilts unfairly, in almost all situations,
in Linden’s favor.122
Consequently, the case continued, and Linden answered
Bragg’s Complaint shortly after the ruling.123 Interestingly, in its
Answer, Linden characterized its representations concerning land
as analogies or metaphors.124 “‘[S]elling land free and clear,’”
Linden averred, “and selling ‘title’ are metaphors or analogies to
the concept of ownership of real property, as what is ‘owned’ with
118

Id. at 600.
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 611.
122
Id.
123
Posting of Robin Linden to Second Life Blog, Linden Lab Files Response to
Complaint, http://blog.secondlife.com/2007/06/29/linden-lab-files-response-to-complaint
(June 29, 2007, 1:34 P.M.).
124
Answer at 10–11, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa
2007) (No. 06-4925), available at http://lawy-ers.com/linden-answer.pdf [hereinafter
Bragg Answer].
119
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respect to ‘virtual land’ in Second Life is in fact a license to
computing resources.”125 Moreover, Linden framed the primary
issue in the case not as one of virtual property, but as one of fraud
and exploitation on behalf of Bragg.126
Even though Bragg was not an especially sympathetic plaintiff
because his actions were potentially a violation of Linden’s ToS,
Linden, shortly after answering the Complaint, decided to
confidentially settle the dispute with Bragg.127 This may have
proven to be a wise decision by Linden. At least one mock jury
familiar with the issues presented in the case, a Harvard Law
School evidence class, found that Linden Lab was not justified in
taking the property Bragg had acquired before the Taessot
transaction.128 The students reasoned that Bragg was justified in
his reliance on Linden’s representations.129
2.

Bragg’s Immediate Consequences

Shortly after the Bragg case, Linden altered its ToS.130 The
objective of the change, understandably, was to bring the ToS into
line with the Bragg ruling and forestall future attempts by Second
Life users to attack the agreement and especially its arbitration
provision on the grounds of unconscionability. Linden focused its
changes on three issues that the Bragg Court found problematic in
the earlier version of the ToS: the potential cost of arbitration to an
aggrieved user; the overall effectiveness and ease of use of the
125

Id.
See id. at 20.
127
See Adam Reuters, Linden Lab Settles Bragg Lawsuit, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS
CENTER, Oct. 4, 2007, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2007/10/04/linden-lab-settlesbragg-lawsuit.
128
See Second Life Herald, Harvard Law Mock Trial: Jury Votes Bragg 6, Linden Lab
3, http://foo.secondlifeherald.com/slh/2007/02/mock_trial_at_h.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2008).
129
See Jury Deliberation Transcript, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cyberone/wiki/
Jury_deliberation_Transcript (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). Stephen Horowitz, one of the
class’s students, has also written a law review article on the mock trial and the jury’s
deliberations. See Stephen J. Horowitz, Bragg v. Linden’s Second Life: A Primer in
Virtual World Justice, 34 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 223 (2008).
130
See Posting of Robin Linden to Second Life Blog, A Change to the Terms of
Service, http://blog.secondlife.com/2007/09/18/a-change-to-the-terms-of-service (Sept.
18, 2007, 11:07 PST) [hereinafter Robin Linden, Change to ToS].
126
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dispute resolution generally; and the arbitration provision was
buried in a “General Provisions” section of the ToS.131 The
revised ToS address all of these problems. First, they provide that
a user with less than $10,000 at issue in a dispute with Linden has
the option to participate in “binding, non-appearance-based
arbitration” that allows the user to choose to have her claim heard
by an arbitrator “by telephone, online,132 or based solely on written
submissions.”133 Second, the ToS, by capping the amount in
dispute for the arbitration option at $10,000, effectively limit a
user’s out-of-pocket arbitration expenses to around $200.134 The
previous version of the ToS, on the other hand, required that
binding arbitration be conducted in San Francisco in front of a
panel of three arbitrators.135 Thus, under the old ToS, the cost of
travel and arbitration for disputes would in most cases exceed the
dollar amount at issue.136 Finally, the revised ToS now include the
arbitration provision within a separate “Dispute Resolution”
section.137 The revised ToS have yet to be tested by a court;
however, as discussed below, it is likely that it will not be struck
down as unconscionable in subsequent litigation.

131

See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 607–11.
Interestingly, the online dispute resolution option opens the door for arbitration to be
conducted within Second Life. See Adam Reuters, Linden Raises Possibility of Virtual
Arbitration in New ToS, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS CENTER, Sept. 18, 2007,
http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2007/09/18/linden-revamps-arbitration-in-newterms-of-service/ (“‘We’re extremely excited about arbitration centers coming to Second
Life’ said Catherine Smith, a spokeswoman for Linden. ‘If the arbitrator can conduct
arbitration in Second Life, we’re very much open to using Second Life to resolve
disputes between Residents and Linden Lab.’”).
133
Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, §§ 7.1–7.4.
134
See id.; Robin Linden, Change to ToS, supra note 130 (“[T]he exact cost depends on
the ADR provider selected. . . . For example, the National Arbitration Forum’s rules
currently provide that consumers will pay at most $185.00 in disputes between
consumers and businesses where the total amount of damages sought is less than
$10,000.00 USD. Businesses pay the remainder of the fees charged by the NAF.”).
135
See
Internet
Archive—Second
Life’s
Terms
of
Service,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070515014546/http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
136
See generally International Chamber of Commerce—Arbitration Cost Calculator,
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4097/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
137
See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, §§ 7.1–7.4.
132
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Davidson & Associates v. Jung138 and Its Implications

Although there is a circuit split regarding the enforceability of
EULAs in the general computer software licensing context,139
Davidson v. Jung, an important licensing case, is relevant to
Second Life and this Note’s analysis for two reasons. First, as a
factual matter, Davidson dealt specifically with the enforcement of
computer game EULAs and thus would apply to Second Life,
which a court is likely to regard as a game. Second, the EULA at
issue in Davidson was a “clickwrap” license. A clickwrap license
is one in which an online user clicks “I agree” to contract terms of
use for the online program or service she desires to use.140
Clickwrap licenses differ from “shrinkwrap” and “browsewrap”
licenses because the former are actually contained in or on a
package (hence the use of the term “shrinkwrap”) that contains the
software that the user seeks to use.141 With the latter, the user may
never see the contract at all, but the contract’s terms nevertheless
provide that use of the website constitute assent to them.142
Importantly, Second Life employs a clickwrap license, and a
potential user of Second Life can only enter into the virtual world
by clicking “I agree” to the agreement’s terms.
In Davidson, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision to enforce the clickwrap EULAs of CD-ROM computer
138

Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing
the terms of a “shrinkwrap” EULA contained within a software CD), and I.Lan Systems,
Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002) (following
ProCD and holding that the terms of a “clickwrap” agreement that appeared on
defendant’s computer screen while defendant was installing plaintiff’s software and that
defendant clicked “I agree” was also enforceable), with Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce a “browsewrap” EULA that
appeared on-screen as plaintiffs installed Netscape’s internet browser software and noting
that the plaintiffs’ “bare act” of downloading the software did not “unambiguously
manifest assent” to the provisions of the EULA).
140
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459 (2006) [hereinafter
Lemley, Terms of Use].
141
See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449; Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1239–47 (1995).
142
Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 459 (“[A]n increasing number of courts
have enforced ‘browsewrap’ licenses, in which the user does not see the contract at all
but in which the license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a
contract whether the user knows it or not.”).
139
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games created and sold by Blizzard Entertainment that required
users to click an on-screen “I agree” button during the installation
of the games.143 Defendants had reverse-engineered Blizzard’s
games for multiplayer online use, thus violating the games’
EULAs.144 Because the Eighth Circuit spent no time discussing
the details of the district court’s unconscionability ruling, it is the
district court’s reasoning that is most instructive. The district court
held that the games’ EULAs were neither procedurally nor
substantively unconscionable.145
Regarding procedural
unconscionability, the court reasoned that although the parties in
the case did have unequal bargaining power, defendants had the
choice to purchase other video games or return the game for a
refund if they were unhappy with the contract’s terms.146
Moreover, the court reasoned, the EULAs’ terms did not “surprise”
defendants because defendants had notice that the games were
subject to EULAs and had thirty days to decide whether to adhere
to the EULAs’ terms or to return the games.147 Regarding
substantive unconscionability, the court, with little accompanying
analysis, declared that the EULAs’ terms were not so one-sided so
as to “shock the conscience” or “impose harsh or oppressive
terms.”148 This result was not necessarily surprising, for as
Professor Lemley notes, “[e]very court to consider the issue has
found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . enforceable.”149
Thus, it is clear that the Bragg decision cuts against the
prevailing trend in the case law. So, what explains Bragg’s
outcome? Additionally, are courts in the Ninth Circuit, where
future battles regarding Second Life will be litigated,150 likely to

143

Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 634–35 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 635.
145
See Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 1179–80.
148
Id. at 1180.
149
See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 459 (citing cases from years 1998 to
2006).
150
Linden’s ToS contain a choice-of-law provision that provides that California law
governs the agreement. See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 7.1 (“This
Agreement and the relationship between you and Linden Lab shall be governed in all
144
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find Linden’s ToS unconscionable given (1) the changes that
Linden made to its ToS in the wake of Bragg and (2) the
unconscionability analysis of Davidson, which is not only the most
on-point of the “clickwrap” EULA precedents, but also the
precedent from the highest court?
4. Explaining Bragg’s Result
Bragg’s anomalous result can, at least to some extent, be
explained by the court’s reliance on Comb v. Paypal, Inc.151
Importantly, the key facts of Comb are readily distinguishable from
the key facts of Bragg. To be sure, Comb, like Bragg, involved an
arbitration clause being challenged as unconscionable; however,
Comb involved a browsewrap license while Bragg involved a
clickwrap license. As discussed above, the distinction matters, for
courts are generally much more likely to strike down a browsewrap
license than a clickwrap license.152 In Comb, unlike in Bragg, the
user agreement was not automatically displayed to customers prior
to their signing up for the service.153 Instead, the agreement was
accessible though a link that was on the same page as the “I agree”
button.154 Thus, the Bragg court’s statement that the plaintiffs in
Comb had assented to the agreement “in circumstances similar to
this case”155 requires a somewhat broad reading of that phrase.
Moreover, the clickwrap versus browsewrap distinction is
particularly important because one of the primary factors that the
Bragg court assessed in the procedural component of its
respects by the laws of the State of California without regard to conflict of law principles
or the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods.”).
151
Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
152
Compare Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 462 (“The law has paid some
attention to the impact of terms of use on consumers: virtually all of the courts that have
refused to enforce a browsewrap license have done so to protect consumers.”), with id. at
459 (indicating that every clickwrap license that had been challenged by the time of the
article’s publication had been upheld as enforceable).
153
Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
154
Id. (“A link to the text of the User Agreement is located at the bottom of the
application. The link need not be opened for the application to be processed. The User
Agreement is lengthy, consisting of twenty-five printed pages and eleven sections, each
containing a number of subparagraphs enumerating the parties’ respective obligations
and duties.”).
155
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 607 (E.D. Pa. 2007).

VOL19_BOOK3_RILEY

2009]

4/21/2009 9:39:07 PM

SECOND LIFE LAND DISPUTES

905

unconscionability analysis was the surprise element.156 One would
presumably be more surprised by terms that existed on a
completely different web page, as in Comb, than terms that were
on the same page as the “I agree” button, as in Bragg. Because
Comb was the lynchpin of the Bragg court’s analysis, and Comb is
crucially distinguishable from Bragg, the court’s unconscionability
analysis seems dubious.
5. Will Linden’s ToS Be Held Unconscionable in the Future?
It is not likely that a future court will find Linden’s ToS
unconscionable for two reasons.157 First, by altering its ToS,
Linden successfully addressed all of the issues raised in Bragg
This is particularly
concerning its arbitration provision.158
important because according to an empirical study, arbitration
provisions are struck down as unconscionable at nearly twice the
rate as that of other contract provisions.159 Second, it is likely that
a court hearing the case would properly look to Davidson, and not
Comb, for guidance on the issue of unconscionability, as Davidson
is the leading case on the enforceability of clickwrap licenses, and
it, like Second Life, involves the license agreement of what a court
would likely regard as a game.
Applying Davidson’s procedural unconscionability analysis to
Second Life, an aggrieved Second Life landowner has a choice of
other virtual worlds to join. She, like the defendants in Davidson
that could have purchased other computer games, could have
chosen to join other virtual worlds such as There.com.160 Of
course, There.com is not Second Life. It offers a different user
156

See id. at 606 (“The procedural element of unconscionability also ‘focuses on . . .
surprise.’” (quoting Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 275 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003))).
157
But see Sheldon, supra note 102, at 778 (stating that virtual-world users cannot
terminate their agreements as easily as defendants in Davidson, that they may be
surprised by virtual world EULAs that can be altered at any time, and that the substantive
terms of EULAs that allow the virtual-world operator to close user access for any or no
reason to her online assets may “shock the conscience”).
158
See supra Part I.C.2.
159
See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004).
160
See There.com, http://www.there.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
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experience just as an alternate computer game would have offered
a different gaming experience for defendants in Davidson;
nevertheless, it is still an alternate choice. Additionally, it is
unlikely that an aggrieved plaintiff would be able to successfully
deploy an argument for surprise with respect to the specific
provisions of the new ToS given the tremendous amount of buzz
among Second Life users about the ToS and the changes they
received after Bragg.
The substantive unconscionability issue under Davidson is a
closer one. It is not completely clear whether a court might find
that the ToS provision providing that Linden can shut down a
user’s account for any or no reason is so one-sided as to “shock the
conscience.” The empirical data, however, suggests that a court
likely would not find the provision unconscionable, as the doctrine
of unconscionability is scarcely used by courts,161 and as courts
had enforced all clickwrap licenses before Bragg.162
II. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION APPROACH
A. Why Consumer Protection?
As the above sections indicate, the property-based and
contract-based approaches to judicial recognition of virtual assets
in Second Life are problematic from a doctrinal perspective. This
is because even the most practical and plausible of the propertybased approaches discussed above first requires a court to strike
down Second Life’s ToS, and as the state of contract law,
especially in the clickwrap context, seems to indicate, this is
unlikely to happen. Consumer protection law thus provides the
best doctrinal grounds for aggrieved users of Second Life to
161

See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic
Age: European Alternatives, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 121 n.69 (2003) (stating that the
number of unconscionability cases “is in the tens or hundreds”); Robert L. Oakley,
Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts,
42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1062 (2005) (“Although unconscionability is an available
doctrine and is occasionally used, in fact the number of cases in which it has actually
been found is relatively small.”).
162
Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 459.
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receive judicial relief. The policy arguments in favor of the use of
consumer protection law are no less convincing.
On policy grounds, three observations about consumer
protection law are instructive: (1) the purpose of statutory
consumer protection law has always been to cover those fringes of
the law not reached by common-law doctrine;163 (2) consumer
protection law, more than other areas of law, takes into account the
effect of a company’s representations on consumers;164 and (3) the
more commodified an environment becomes, the more its market
participants are able to rely effectively on consumer protection
law, because commodification itself transforms these participants
into consumers, a group that the legislature has singled out for
protection based on their status as such.165
First, modern consumer-protection law as it has been
articulated by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and state
legislatures throughout the country has historically been a legal
reform effort addressing the perceived inequities of traditional
legal doctrine.166 In other words, it has traditionally been the
purpose of statutory consumer protection law to patrol those areas
of the law not covered by the common law of contract, property, or
tort. For example, “contract worship[s] the sanctity of the written
agreement, and ma[kes] no exception for consumer transactions
where the document [is] under total control of the seller and [is]
not the subject of real bargaining. Harsh adhesion clauses c[an] be
forced on buyers who ha[ve] no viable alternatives.”167 Indeed,
contract law assumes that parties to a contract are equal in terms of
power and information, when in actuality, consumers have
substantially less power and information than the large corporate
entities with whom they frequently contract.168 Consequently,
“[t]he common law of contract simply cannot afford consumers the
protection they probably would seek if they were rational, fully
informed, and equal in economic power to the supplier. Because
163
164
165
166
167
168

E.g., DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 2–3 (2007).
Id.
See Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, supra note 25, at 95.
PRIDGEN, supra note 163, at 2.
Id.
Goldring, Consumer Protection Globalization and Democracy, supra note 31, at 3.
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contract law is an inadequate basis for the legal transaction, it must
be modified by legislation.”169
Similarly, tort law places
considerable obstacles in the path of consumers seeking redress for
deceptive business practices and misleading representations.170 As
a result, statutes such as the federal consumer protection law that
prohibits unfair or deceptive practices, Section 5 of the FTC Act,171
and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)172 contain
broad language that was and continues to be flexible enough to
effectuate the prophylactic purpose of the statutes and fill in the
doctrinal gaps in the common law.173
Consumer protection law’s broad purpose and history remain
important in a discussion of Second Life because now, like the
consumers in the early twentieth century who were the first to
benefit from consumer protection laws, consumers in Second Life
are not sufficiently protected by common-law doctrines; the likely
continued enforceability of clickwrap contracts will render
impotent both contract and property arguments by aggrieved
Second Life users in the future. Moreover, while a court’s finding
of unconscionability of the ToS would be bold indeed, a finding of
a violation of consumer protection law requires no such judicial
boldness. An unconscionability finding would not only blow
against the prevailing winds of current case law, but also require
expenditure of a court’s limited institutional capital, which the
court may be disinclined to use for a cause like this. Compared to
Linden and other businesses that employ ToS and EULAs, Second
Life users are poorly organized and politically impotent.
Additionally, such a decision would also put a court at risk of
being reversed on appeal. This risk, of course, would not be as
great if the court heard the case under consumer protection law.
Second, consumer protection law’s focus on the effect of
representations on consumers174 makes it a particularly valuable
169

Id. at 3–4.
PRIDGEN, supra note 163, at 2.
171
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
172
CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17200 (West 1997).
173
See JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 12 (1990).
174
See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, reprinted in In The Matter of Cliffdale
Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174–84 (1984) (“Certain elements undergird all
deception cases. First, there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely
170
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option to an aggrieved Second Life user. While both contract and
property law do contain some features that regulate sellers’
representations regarding their products––take for example,
fraudulent or material misrepresentation in contract175 or Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act176––these features are either too difficult
for a consumer to prove that they are effectively useless (fraud) or
not available to consumers at all (the Lanham Act provision). As
discussed in further detail below,177 consumer protection proof
requirements concerning the nature and effect of representations
are much less rigid than those of the common law.
Representations are significant to Second Life users because
Linden’s representations concerning land sales and the company’s
recognition of intellectual property are numerous and varied; also,
these same representations have fueled Second Life’s tremendous
growth and its commodification. Linden has had huge incentive to
mislead land purchasers with its representations concerning land;
indeed, its business model has depended upon it.178
Finally, Jack Balkin has argued that the more commodified a
virtual world becomes and the more a virtual world’s business
model is based upon its commodification, the more likely it is that
aggrieved users will and should use consumer protection laws in
the courts to protect their reliance interests.179 Commodification of
a virtual world, the buying and selling of virtual items in the world
using real-world currency, invites the law in.180 Balkin writes:
Game designers cannot have it both ways. . . .
The more that people flock to [virtual worlds],
spend large amounts of time in them, become
to mislead the consumer. Practices that have been found to be misleading or deceptive in
specific cases include false oral or written representations . . . .”).
175
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981) (setting forth the elements
of a material or fraudulent representation).
176
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (permitting business competitors to sue each other for
false advertising, among other things).
177
See infra Part II.B.
178
As discussed above, land sales generate more than half of Linden’s revenue, and in
order to run a business in Second Life, one of the most popular activities in the virtual
world, one must purchase land. See supra Part I.
179
See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in
Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2046–47 (2004).
180
Id.
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enmeshed in them, and spend considerable sums in
them––as the business model hopes they will––the
more people will demand that the state protect them
when they are injured in ways that they think are
inappropriate, whether or not the EULA or the TOS
give them any remedy. . . . [T]he more that the
platform owner attempts to make the game space a
new version of the shopping mall, the less likely the
First Amendment will or should protect them when
the state wants to vindicate the reliance and
property interests of the players. . . . Treat the
players as consumers, and they will demand
consumer protection.181
It seems that underlying Balkin’s argument is the notion that
commodification transforms mere “players” of Second Life into
“consumers,” and that once this transformation has occurred,
consumer protection law provides special protection to consumers
in a dynamic marketplace based upon the consumers’ classification
as such. This idea that “consumers are different” is an important
theory underlying consumer protection law.182 It recognizes that
the consumer, a single person, often has neither the power nor the
information to appropriately protect her own interests and that the
common law often does not adequately protect these interests
either.183 Consequently, the legislature must provide the protection
that the common law cannot. The purpose of contract and property
law, on the other hand, has little to do with a rightholder’s special
status as a consumer.184
181
182
183

Id. at 2073.
See Goldring, Consumer Law and Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 116.
Goldring, Consumer Protection Globalization and Democracy, supra note 31, at 3–

4.
184

Professors Merrill and Smith’s description of the purpose of contract and property
law is instructive:
In personam [contract] rights are an instance of what can be called a
governance strategy for determining use rights; in rem [property]
rights reflect an exclusion strategy for determining use rights. . . .
Governance rules typically specify particular uses in some detail,
including often the identity of the rightholder and the dutyholder.
Indeed, often the dutyholder will need to know the identity of the
rightholder in order to avoid violating the duty. . . . Exclusion
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Linden clearly possesses the attributes described by Balkin,
and Linden’s business model is based upon commodification of
Second Life in three respects. First, land sales in Second Life
make up more than a majority of the company’s revenue.185
Second, only landowners in Second Life can run businesses, an
activity that is one of the primary attractions of the virtual world in
the first instance.186 Finally, Linden has made the business
decision to actively commodify Second Life, and the examples of
commodification abound: Linden runs a currency exchange for its
users;187 it made the strategic decision to grant its users IP rights in
their creations,188 thus encouraging users to trade their creations
via market transactions; and it encourages those who do choose to
buy land from Linden to subdivide, resell, or rent it as the owner
sees fit.189 Commodification of Second Life has quickly brought
Linden millions of users and much business success; however, it is
also what places the company at risk of suit under consumer
protection law.
Moreover, Linden’s relationship with its users, particularly
regarding land, is one in which there is particularly acute
information asymmetry.
Legislatures enacting consumer
protection laws recognized the risks of this very type of asymmetry
and that consumer protection law, unlike common law, is meant to
protect users from ex post. Linden does not make it clear to its
users what they are getting when they “buy land” from the
company. In fact, it may be so that because land sales are so
strategies, by contrast, proceed by restricting access to a particular
resource rather than by specifying permitted or prohibited uses.
Thomas E. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773, 791 (2001).
185
See Rappeport, supra note 26.
186
See supra Part I.A.
187
See Second Life—Currency Exchange, supra note 27.
188
See Ondrejka, supra note 36, at 95.
189
See
Second
Life—How
Do
I
Join
&
Split
Land?,
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task=knowledge&q
uestionID=4243 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Second Life—How Do I Rent Land to Other
People?,
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task=
knowledge&questionID=4416 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Second Life—How Do I Sell
Land?,
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task=
knowledge&questionID=4530 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Second Life—Land: Get Your
Land, http://secondlife.com/community/land-getyours.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
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important to Linden, Linden, as part of its marketing, actually
attempts make this as unclear as possible. For example, on the
Frequently Asked Questions from Beginning Landowners (“FAQ”)
webpage,190 there is not a single question and answer that explains
the rights a user has to land once she has purchased it from Linden
or that conveys any information similar to that of the critical
provisions of Linden’s ToS.191 The author of this Note imagines
that it would be quite simple for Linden to add a few questions and
answers to the FAQ page that communicate, inter alia, that
purchased land in Second Life is nothing more than licensed space
on servers owned by Linden in California and that Linden has the
right to seize a user’s land for any or no reason. The
communication of these facts, however, does not seem to be in
Linden’s business interest as it could result in fewer land sales and
consequently less revenue for Linden.
Additionally, the uniqueness of Second Life’s land sales model
among virtual-world providers exacerbates a Second Life user’s
lack of information because she has few frames of reference from
which to know what is common or standard industry practice.
Since Linden is only one of the few virtual-world providers that
sell land, it is not clear that there is a standard industry practice.
Consequently, Second Life users are left at the mercy of Linden
and its representations. All they know is what Linden tells them,
and what Linden tells them is terribly insufficient.
The following Section shows the ease with which a court can
apply consumer protection doctrine to land sales in Second Life
and describes in further detail how Linden’s representations
ultimately may bring the company liability in the courtroom.
B. Applicable Law—California’s Unfair Competition Law
(“UCL”)
Linden’s ToS contain a choice-of-law provision that provides
that California law governs the agreement.192 This is, at least from
190

See Second Life—FAQ from Beginning Landowners, supra note 64.
See id.
192
See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 7.1 (“This Agreement and the
relationship between you and Linden Lab shall be governed in all respects by the laws of
191
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the consumer protection perspective, an asset to an aggrieved
Second Life user because California’s consumer protection laws
are among the strongest in the country,193 particularly California’s
Unfair Competition Law.194 The UCL broadly defines unfair
competition and prohibits it under five prongs: (1) unlawful
conduct; (2) unfair conduct; (3) fraudulent conduct; (4) deceptive
advertising; and (5) violations of § 17500, California’s “false
advertising” statute.195 The “unlawful” prong covers any business
practice that violates any statute, regulation, or ordinance,196 and it,
like the “deceptive advertising” and “false advertising” prongs,
would be less helpful to an aggrieved Second Life user in an action
under the UCL than the “unfair” and “fraudulent” prongs.197
There are two tests of a business practice under the “unfair”
prong of the UCL. In one, a court must weigh the utility of the
defendant’s conduct against the nature of the harm to the plaintiff
while taking into consideration the motives of the alleged
wrongdoer.198 In the other, the court must determine whether the
alleged business practice is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,

the State of California without regard to conflict of law principles or the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods.”).
193
See, e.g., Wershaba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 160 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (“California’s consumer protection laws are among the strongest in the
country. . . . California’s unfair competition law imposes liability without the necessity of
showing intent.”).
194
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 76–77
(2004) (“California’s consumer protection statute . . . warrants special mention because of
the breadth of the statute, California’s importance as a commercial state, and the
enforcement activism of both the Attorney General’s office and private plaintiffs within
the state.”).
195
Sharon J. Arkin, The Unfair Competition Law After Proposition 64: Changing the
Consumer Protection Landscape, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005); see also CAL.
BUS. & PROF. § 17200 (West 2009).
196
Arkin, supra note 195, at 158.
197
The “deceptive advertising” prong is substantially similar to the “false advertising”
prong of the UCL. Id. at 163. The “false advertising” prong is less forgiving than the
fraud prong because it has a scienter requirement. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17500 (West
2009) (prohibiting any advertising “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known,
or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading .
. . .”); Arkin, supra note 195, at 161, 164.
198
Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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unscrupulous or substantially injurious to customers.”199 Though
the California Supreme Court has determined the appropriate
“unfair” test in competitor-versus-competitor actions,200 it has yet
to determine the standard in consumer actions.201
A business practice is fraudulent when “members of the public
are likely to be deceived” by the defendant’s conduct.202 This
standard, of course, is quite different from that of a common-law
fraud claim, which requires intent to deceive, actual falsehood, and
damages to the victim.203 A business practice is “likely to deceive”
under the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL if it is “probable that a
significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted
consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be
misled.”204 Where the business practice “is targeted to a particular
group or type of consumers [that is] either more . . . or less
sophisticated than the ordinary consumer, . . . whether it is
misleading to the public” will be judged from the view of members
of the targeted group.205 Moreover, there is no requirement that
the alleged fraudulent business practice occur in the context of an
advertisement.206 For example, in People v. Dollar Rent-a-Car
Systems, Inc., the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s conclusion that Dollar’s contract language and its

199
People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
200
See Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal.
1999) (“[T]he word ‘unfair’ in [the UCL] means conduct that threatens an incipient
violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because
its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise
significantly threatens or harms competition.”).
201
Arkin, supra note 195, at 160.
202
Comm. on Children’s Television v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal.
1983).
203
See, e.g., Day v. AT&T, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“A fraudulent
deception must be actually false, known to be false by the perpetrator and reasonably
relied upon by a victim who incurs damages. None of these elements are required to state
a claim for injunctive relief under [the UCL]. A perfectly true statement couched in such
a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to
disclose other relevant information, is actionable under these sections.”).
204
Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
205
Id. at 498.
206
Arkin, supra note 195, at 163.
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employees’ conduct regarding the company’s collision damage
waiver were a violation of the UCL.207
The “primary purpose of [the UCL is] to ‘extend[] to the entire
consuming public the protection once afforded only to business
competitors.’”208 Consequently, courts should construe the UCL
broadly.209 Nevertheless, despite the broad language of the statute
and its public policy underpinnings, the UCL has two
shortcomings: (1) it only offers injunctive relief, not monetary
damages, to an aggrieved consumer;210 and (2) it has a standing
provision211 enacted by a voter proposition212 that can foreclose a
claim under the UCL for some potential litigants.
The first shortcoming can be somewhat easily overcome,
however, because although the UCL does not provide for monetary
damages, it does allow for restitution.213 As the Supreme Court of
California explained in Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products
Co., the remedies provision of the UCL
authorizes the court to fashion remedies to prevent,
deter, and compensate for unfair business practices.
In addition to injunctions, it authorizes orders that
are necessary to prevent practices that constitute
unfair competition and to make “orders or
judgments . . . as may be necessary to restore” to
persons in interest any money or property acquired
by unfair competition.214
Consequently, the court upheld the equitable judgments of trial
and appellate courts ordering a business to pay an employee whose
207

See People v. Dollar Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 259 Cal Rptr. 191, 197–99 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989).
208
Bank of the W. v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Barquis v.
Merchants Collection Ass’n, 496 P.2d 817, 828 (Cal. 1972)).
209
See Arkin, supra note 195, at 157.
210
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17203 (West 2009).
211
See id. § 17204 (“[Standing for an individual is limited to] a person who has suffered
injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.”).
212
See generally Arkin, supra note 195, at 167–70 (discussing Proposition 64 and its
standing requirement); Jacquetta Lannan, Saving 17200: An Analysis of Proposition 64,
46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 451 (2006) (same).
213
See Arkin, supra note 195, at 165.
214
Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 714–15 (Cal. 2000).
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wages it withheld in violation of California’s labor code, and thus,
the UCL.215 The court reasoned that the restitution order was
appropriate because it restored the employee to status quo ante216
and because he had a “vested property right[]” in the withheld
salary, even though the employee never had actual possession of
it.217 More recently, the California Supreme Court stated the UCL
principle of restitution even more succinctly: “Under the UCL, an
individual may recover profits unfairly obtained to the extent that
these profits represent monies given to the defendant or benefits in
which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.”218 Additionally, a
court can order restitution even when injunctive relief is not
appropriate;219 that is, a court can order restitution even when the
defendant has stopped engaging in unlawful conduct.220 Thus,
even though the UCL does not technically allow for recovery of
monetary damages, an order of restitution, for all intents and
purposes, produces the same result as an award of damages to a
plaintiff with a vested property interest or ownership right in
property that was lost as a result of the violation of the UCL.
Section 17204, the UCL’s provision on standing, provides that
in order for a private individual to bring a UCL claim the
individual must be one who “has suffered injury in fact” and who
has “lost money or property as a result of such unfair
competition.”221 Previously, the standing requirement was far less
stringent and “a private plaintiff who ha[d] himself suffered no
injury at all [could] sue to obtain relief for others.”222 The standing
provision, therefore, now has important implications for

215

Id. at 715.
Id.
217
Id. (quoting Loehr v. Ventura Cmty. Coll. Dist., 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 581 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983)).
218
Korea Supply v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 947 (Cal. 2003).
219
See, e.g., ABC Int’l Traders v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 931 P.2d 290, 304 (Cal.
1997) (“[W]e conclude that [the UCL] authorizes a trial court to order restitution of
money lost though acts of unfair competition . . . whether or not the court also enjoins
future violations.”).
220
Arkin, supra note 195, at 165.
221
CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17204.
222
See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Cal.
1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
216
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representative actions and situations where harm to a specific
person might be hard to prove.223
C. Application of the UCL to Second Life
The “fraudulent” prong of the UCL provides the best chance of
recovery for an aggrieved Second Life landowner. It has the
broadest language of the UCL prongs: unlike the “false
advertising” prong, it lacks a scienter requirement; and, unlike the
“unfair” prong, its law is well-settled and clear with regard to
consumer transactions.224 The Second Life user would have a
strong argument that a significant portion of targeted consumers,
acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled by the
representations of Linden and its executives about land ownership
and property ownership in general in Second Life for three
reasons.
First, Linden and Philip Rosedale, Linden’s founder and
original CEO, have explicitly used real-property terms when
discussing what Linden claims is simply licensing of server space
by a user. As discussed above, for example, Rosedale has
mentioned “selling free and clear” while describing land sales.225
Even more simply, the Second Life website uses the term “land” to
describe the server space and discusses “land sales” and the
process of “buy[ing] land” from residents.226 Nowhere on the
Second Life land webpages does it say what exactly land is (server
space) and what exactly users are getting when they buy it (a
license). Moreover, the ToS do not contain this information either.
Additionally, the land “analogy,” as Linden refers to it,227 is not on
the Second Life website or mentioned in any of Linden’s numerous
press releases hyping its service. Indeed, from what the author of

223
See, e.g., Shannon Z. Peterson, California Proposition 64 Requires That Pending
Actions Based on Unfair Competition or False Advertising Laws Be Dismissed, 10 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 73, 73–74 (2005).
224
See generally Arkin, supra note 195, at 160–64.
225
See Krotski, supra note 28.
226
See Second Life, Land: Get Your Land, supra note 189.
227
Bragg Answer, supra note 124, at 10–11.
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this Note could find, Linden has mentioned the analogy publicly in
only two publications.228
Second, and perhaps more important, Linden and its officers
have made representations that indicate that they do not regard
Second Life as a “game space” at all, but instead, an extension of
the real world. Cory Ondrejka, a former Linden executive, said in
an academic symposium on virtual worlds, “[t]here are virtually no
traditional game elements in Second Life other than if you look at
the real world as a game, it looks a lot like that.”229 In other words,
Ondrejka argues that Second Life is not a game at all. Indeed,
while discussing Second Life, both Ondrejka and Rosedale have
elucidated this principle clearly by comparing Second Life to a
developing nation. In one interview, Rosedale said, “[w]e like to
think of Second Life as ostensibly as real as a developing
nation. . . . When we were developing the idea we . . . were
inspired by Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital . . . . The
fundamental basis of a successful developing nation is property
ownership.”230 Ondrejka echoed this sentiment in an article he
wrote for a virtual-world symposium. He writes:
New insight comes from Hernando de Soto’s work
in developmental economics, The Mystery of
Capital. In brief, de Soto argues that when property
228

Linden CFO John Zdanowski explained the analogy to CFO Magazine in 2007:
Server space in Second Life is called “land,” using a threedimensional analogy for land. Each CPU can host, or simulate, 16
acres of land. We sell each region as an island for $1,675 as an
upfront setup fee, and then we charge $195 a month for the monthly
maintenance fee, which is a recurring charge.
Rappeport, supra note 26. And, to interviewer Kate Bulkley of The Guardian, Linden’s
then-CEO Philip Rosedale stated:
It is a virtual real estate business but it is a little less abstract than a
lot of people suggest. What we are really selling you is computation.
We are selling you CPU core. If you buy a 16-acre piece of land,
which is about four city blocks, what you are renting is one
processor.
Kate Bulkley, Today Second Life, Tomorrow the World, GUARDIAN, May 17, 2007,
Technology News & Features, at 5, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2007/may/17/media.newmedia2.
229
Symposium, Ownership in Online Worlds, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 807, 821 (2005).
230
See Krotski, supra note 28.
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does not have recognized titles and proofs of
ownership, it is not fungible. Thus, the vast
majority of the third world’s population, despite
having valuable assets like homes, land, businesses,
cannot leverage these assets because they do not
legally own them. . . .
Most relevant to the
Metaverse [Second Life], untitled property cannot
be used to secure loans or to set up a legal business.
On the way to the Metaverse, individuals and
businesses will create objects of significant value,
and may well be handsomely rewarded for it. . . . In
the real world, lack of ownership is a fatal flaw in
attempts to establish free markets. It would be a
mistake to think that virtual worlds will be any
different—free markets and property rights are prerequisites to innovation.231
If Linden regards, or at least used to regard,232 Second Life as
an extension of the real world and treats it as such by running a
currency exchange,233 engaging in land sales, and regulating
Second Life in compliance with at least some federal laws,234 it
should not be surprising that its users regard and treat it similarly
and expect that, as in the real world, land they have purchased
from Linden cannot be taken from them without just
compensation.
Finally, Linden’s representations concerning its grant of
intellectual property (“IP”) rights to its users are misleading
because the representations can cause the users to conflate IP rights
231

Ondrejka, supra note 36, at 100.
Perhaps realizing the potential liability that such statements may bring, Linden has
eschewed making them. For example, in response to a question about whether running
Second Life is like running an independent country, Rosedale dodged, stating,
We have learned a lot about monetary policy! I love it. We
recognize that the GDP in SL is growing at a rate that is staggeringly
fast, relative to real world economies. I call it light central bank
functions. We would love to find a great economist to come and join
us!
Bulkley, supra note 228, at 5.
233
See Second Life—Currency Exchange, supra note 27.
234
See Ferret, supra note 24 (describing Linden’s decision to shut down casinos in
Second Life in response to an FBI probe).
232
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with rights to their virtual property. For example, Linden founder
and then-CEO Philip Rosedale stated in Linden’s press release
regarding IP rights:
We believe our new policy recognizes the fact that
persistent world users are making significant
contributions to building these worlds and should be
able to both own the content they create and share
in the value that is created. The preservation of
users’ property rights is a necessary step toward the
emergence of genuinely real online worlds.235
Notably, the phrase “property rights” in the last sentence of the
quoted passage is not qualified by the term “intellectual.” Thus, a
land purchaser seeing such a statement may believe that she has
property rights not simply to the objects she creates, but also to the
land that she purchased from Linden.
Although Linden has taken steps to strip a majority of the
“ownership” language from its website236 and altered its ToS to
make the distinction between IP and virtual property clearer,237
these actions, particularly because they have been conducted
relatively sub rosa, will not aid Linden in actions brought by
235

Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents to Own Digital Creations (Nov.
14, 2003), available at http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_11_14.
236
For example, the homepage of Second Life used to say, “Second Life is a 3D online
digital world imagined, created and owned by its residents”; however, now it simply says,
“Second Life is a 3D online digital world imagined and created by its residents.” See
Second Life—What Is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis (last visited Feb. 28,
2009); Posting of Ren Reynolds to Terra Nova Blog, Residents No Longer Own Second
Life?, http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2007/10/residents-no-lo.html#more (Oct. 27,
2007, 06:56). Similarly, the “IP Rights” page on Second Life’s site used to say “You
create it, you own it—and it’s yours to do with as you please.” See Posting of Steve
O’Hear to ZDnet’s The Social Web, Second Life IP Rights; Here Today, Gone
Tomorrow, http://blogs.zdnet.com/social/?p=83 (Feb. 3, 2007, 7:38 A.M.). In February
2008, however, it only said, “If you create it, you can sell it, trade it, and even give it
away for free, subject of course to our Terms of Service.” Second Life—IP Rights, supra
note 54. Now, the Second Life Terms of Service reads “[Y]ou will retain any and all
applicable copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to any Content
you create using the Service, to the extent you have such rights under applicable law.”
Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.1.
237
See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.3 (“Linden Lab retains
ownership of the account and related data, regardless of intellectual property rights you
may have in content you create or otherwise own.”).
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Second Life landowners who have already relied upon Linden’s
past representations.
In response to a complaint, Linden would undoubtedly argue
that the ToS clarify that all users only retain ownership of their IP
rights and not Linden’s server space where the users’ land resides.
Moreover, the low price of the land compared to real property,
Linden would argue, should be a sign to Second Life users that
when they bought land from Linden, they were not getting all of
the sticks in the property rights bundle. Consequently, as Linden
would conclude, it is not reasonable for Second Life users to be
confused about the extent of their ownership.
Linden’s arguments are unavailing. First, as stated above, the
ToS never explicitly mention the word “land” or makes the point
that the land language Linden uses is simply an analogy. If Linden
is going to rely on its ToS, which in any event most users likely do
not read, it should at least make the terms as clear and as explicit
as possible. Of course, Linden has an incentive to keep the ToS
unclear because as long as users continue buying land and continue
believing they own it, Linden’s revenue will increase. Second, the
price of the land should not necessarily serve a cautionary function
to Second Life users. To be sure, it would be absurd in the real
world for one to think that she could acquire title to sixteen acres
of real property for a couple thousand dollars. It would not be so
absurd in Second Life, however, because its market for land is
entirely new. Second Life users have no way of knowing what
land price seems commensurate with the rights they think they are
getting when they buy land.
The two potential pitfalls to litigants under the UCL, standing
and damages, also do not appear to pose significant threats to
potential aggrieved Second Life users. A Second Life user who
had her land stripped away by Linden would suffer the requisite
injury-in-fact because she has been directly and personally affected
by Linden’s actions. Additionally, the termination of her account
would amount to the satisfaction of the other requisite for
standing—lost money or property as a result of the allegedly unfair
business practice—because even if a court does not see the land as
property, there is clearly a strong market in real-world currency for
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land in Second Life. Thus, the seizure of the land would in fact
amount to lost money.
Additionally, although damages are not available to any litigant
under the UCL, an aggrieved Second Life user seems to be a likely
candidate to recover via restitution. A court, using its equitable
powers, would likely find that the Second Life user had a vested
property right to or ownership interest in her land and that
restitution of the value of the land to the user would return her to
status quo ante before she was misled about the nature of her land
purchase. Moreover, even though Linden has taken some steps to
change the nature of its misrepresentations and, arguably, has
stopped engaging in its unlawful conduct, a court could still order
restitution even when injunctive relief may no longer be
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
In their seminal article published more than ten years ago,
David Post and David Johnson argued that cyberspace should be
governed by its own set of rules apart from the real world.238 More
recently, Post and Johnson applied their argument to virtual
worlds, predicting that “territorially-based law will not play a
significant role in resolving [virtual-world] disputes; it will prove
too complex . . . and too expensive . . . .”239 Post and Johnson may
prove to be right in the long term, and their argument may be
particularly applicable to user-versus-user conflicts in virtual
worlds; however, it does not seem particularly correct regarding
user-versus-operator conflicts, particularly virtual-world operators
like Second Life. Linden has actively commodified its world and
made misleading representations regarding land ownership in
238

See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law and
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996) (“If the sysops and users who
collectively inhabit and control a particular area of the Net want to establish special rules
to govern conduct there, and if that rule does not fundamentally impinge upon the vital
interests of others who never visit this new space, then the law of sovereigns in the
physical world should defer to this new form of self-government.”).
239
David R. Johnson & David Post, The Great Debate—Law in the Virtual World,
FIRST MONDAY, Feb. 6, 2006, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/1311/1231.
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Second Life because it has been in its business interest to do so. It
is inevitable that Second Life users will in the near future call upon
real-world law, and particularly consumer protection law, to
resolve disputes between themselves and Linden. The California
consumer protection regime discussed in this Note, unlike the
current contract- and property-based regimes, provides a body of
law readily applicable to hold Linden accountable for its
misrepresentations. This Note’s discussion hopefully will provide
those who have sustained a loss of assets with a possible approach
to litigation against Linden, as well as prompt further change in
Linden’s behavior and its representations to its most loyal users.
Users who buy land in Second Life have an interest in seeing
Second Life continue to thrive. Linden should recognize this and,
most of all, make sure that it no longer alienates or misleads those
who have come to love their alternate reality, the second life with
which Linden has helped provide them.

